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BOOK REVIEWS
S.E.C. action. 33 However, this choice is not fully examined, perhaps
because of the decision to play down public utility holding company problems, in whose soil Chenery grew. However, numerous statutory provisions within the frame of reference emphasized give the Commission
a similar choice. 34

The impact of the Administrative Procedure Act

upon the S.E.C. is well enough discussed, although the author seems to
35
betray an understandable impatience with some of its niceties.
The author's final objective was the production of a teaching tool,
although, as he writes in his preface, this aim was not entirely consistent
with his first, or story-telling, objective. 36 To be sure, he includes ten
or so sample opinions, but his intention can hardly have been to produce
a book for everyday class room use. Rather, he chose, none the less
indispensably, to furnish the basic reference material for taught law
in securities regulation. Students of the subject, whether tuition-paying
or not, needed his presentation. It advances the efficiency with which
we can work in the field a good long step. Dubbing Mr. Loss the
Diderot of his subject would not be too extravagant.
LEHAN K. TUICSt

JUSTICE ACCORDING TO LAW. By Roscoe Pound.* New Haven:
Yale University Press. 1951. Pp. 91. $2.50.

This trilogy of essays is a printing of the lectures delivered by Dean
Pound under the auspices of the John Findley Green Foundation at
Westminster College in 1950. They are entitled, "-Vhat Is Justice?"
"What Is Law ?" and "Judicial Justice."
The condensation of subjects of this moment into 91 pages of text
presages the interpretation and interpolation the reader must make for
himself. From the early Greeks to the present, man has struggled, without too much success, to define "law" and "justice" and to evolve fixed
formulae for both. The author traces the history of this struggle through
the centuries and concludes that Anglo-American jurisprudence, though
not perfect, is superior in all respects to the others which have been tried
or suggested.
33. Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corporation, 318 U.S. 80

(1943), 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
34. See p. 428, for an example.
35. See pp. 736, 1124, 1133.
36. Preface, vi.
t Professor of Law, The State University of Iowa.
* Dean Emeritus, Harvard University Law School.
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In the first essay, Dean Pound, in the best tradition of legal scholarship, re-tells the story of this struggle by the philosophers and jurists
from the days of the early Greek conception of justice as an individual
virtue to the modern theory, and one which the author approves, that
justice is the effort of law to "adjust relations and order conduct so as
to give the most effect to the whole scheme of expectations of men in
civilized society with a minimum of friction and waste."'
Dean Pound highlights the conflict between justice as a system to
preserve the individual's "reasonable expectations"-such as a maximum
allowance of liberty-and the necessary limitations imposed upon such
expectations by the like rights of all others. He views with alarm the
current trend toward imposition of liability without fault, or the "insurance" idea of imposing the loss upon those who can best bear it. The
author's illustration of the suicide's calculating selection of an approaching vehicle as a means of self-destruction vividly illustrates the sophistry
and danger of this trend.
In discussing the current inclination for more and more control
by government, the author makes it clear that he has no more patience
with the view that individual liberty can best be attained through the
maximum exercise of government control than he has with the substitution of social responsibility for the time-tested doctrine of negligence
or moral fault as the basis of liability.
In his second essay, "What Is Law?", lawyers would expect Dean
Pound to champion the cause of the common law-and he does. He
deals at some length with the excellence of "lawyers' law"; and he compares it with social control through the administrative process, which he
condemns unless subject to limitations and judicial review. The training,
experience and tradition of the judges, says Dean Pound, enable them
to "do a great deal at least of what the law expects of them, and by
striving for objective decision as an ideal, [judges] can come close
enough to objective decision for practical purposes even if theoretically
they cannot attain it 100 per cent. ' 2 Thus, he disposes of the argument
of the neo-realists that "lawyers' law" is "gastronomic" 3 and not objective. He argues, as one would expect, for control by rule rather than
control by discretion.
It might well be that he is speaking of the Supreme Court of the
United States, among others, when, after conceding that the uniformity
and objectivity of judicial decision may have been exaggerated in the
1. P. 29.
2. P. 36.
3. See Frank, A Plea For Lawyer Schools, 56

YALE,

L.J. 1303 (1947).
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past, he says: ".

.

. many jurists of today, not without some warrant

in what has been happening recently in a few courts, greatly exaggerate
the personal, subjective, arbitrary element therein."' 4 Dean Pound believes that much of the confusion which exists concerning "law" is due
to the various meanings ascribed to the term, i.e., (1) the legal orderor regime of social control; (2) the authoritative guides, or patterns
of decision (what the lawyer thinks is "law"); and (3) the process of
determining causes by common law courts or administrative agencies.
After again emphasizing that the question is whether the stress is placed
upon rule or discretion, the author concludes that the common law has
proved adequate and is competent to adjust itself to quickly changing
conditions (e.g., the airplane) and that this law of "taught traditions"
has "proved resistant to forces that destroy political institutions." 5
Judicial justice, says Dean Pound in his third essay, is the administration of law by judicial specialists, those who by training, experience
and tradition are fitted for the task of dealing objectively (or as objectively as is humanly possible) with causes. He would have no truck
with realists who preach that the separation of powers of our government
is outmoded and must be superseded by the discretionary action of administrative officers and agencies. The history of legislative justice (e.g.
bills to divorce, bills of attainder, etc.) was largely found, according to
the author, to be without justice in the sense that we know the term today.
Fortunately, decision of causes by legislative fiat is now a practice of
the past. (Justice administered by the executive or ruler was peremptorily dispatched by the author in the second essay.) The argument that
legislative justice is more responsive to the will of the people and, therefore, superior to judicial justice is, to Dean Pound, one of its greatest
faults: "In a large body not so trained and without judicial habits, we
should expect, and experience shows we must expect, many of the characteristic phenomena of what psychologists have called the mob mind." 6
This essay deals with the growth of our law courts as a reaction to the
administrative regimes in Tudor and Stuart England, with a concomitant
overcrowding of the courts which has in turn produced a glut of administrative agencies with policy-making and adjudicating powers. Dean
Pound thinks this second reaction has gone too far ".

.

. if not beyond

He cites the lack of effecthe limits of our constitutional polity. . . .
tive checks on administrative action and, in many cases, the lack of
opportunity for any judicial review.
"

4.P. 36.
5. P. 61.
6. P. 70.

7. P. 73.
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It is ironical and astounding to recall that a large number of neorealists in federal service during the late 1930's were products of the
law school of which the author was then dean. It was then that the
doctrine that a good end justifies the use of any means had its inception
in our law. Dean Pound describes this movement as "a hierarchy of
superman administrative officials who ex-officio know what is good for
us better than we know ourselves." 8 The author has no quarrel with
administrative agencies as such and concedes they are essential to the
tasks at hand. He does, however, decry the frequently successful attempts to free their determinations from judicial review. Such review,
he believes, is essential to ascertain whether the agencies have conducted
their proceedings in accordance with legislative standards and due process
of law.
In making a strong and logical case for the preservation and, indeed,
the strengthening of our system of judicial justice, the author deals
with the objections to that system, e.g. its slowness and rigidity. However, he neglects what many consider to be one of the real faults of
judicial justice today-the lack of an efficient method of selecting competent lawyers for service on the bench.
The prospective reader must be warned that this small book is hard
readingY Dean Pound is so much the scholar, on such good speaking
terms with the philosophers from Thales to Dewey, so much the historian
and the legal philosopher that some of his arguments and erudite references require several readings. This reviewer wishes the author had
given more heed to the admonition of Socrates, as reported by Plato in
"Phaedrus" that the orator must adapt his speech to the comprehension
of his audience. Nevertheless, the book is timely. Unfortunately, it will
not have popular appeal nor appreciation. If reduced to layman's language and given wide circulation, it might prove a great force in the
preservation and reinvigoration of the judicial justice which in large part
nurtured the extrordinary development of this country.
RICHARD P. TINKHAM.I
8. P. 84.

9. Coudert, Book Review, 38 A.B.A.J. 222, 223 (1952).
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